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JAMAICA:

T a x Reform:
Evaluation and Lessons
Roy

Bahl

Roy Bahl is Professor of Economics and Director, Policy Research Program,
Georgia State University. Professor Bahl was Director of the Jamaica Tax Reform
Project.

The Government of Jamaica implemented a major reform
of its income tax structure in 1986. A complicated, narrowbased individual income tax, levied under a progressive
statutory rate structure, was replaced by a broad-based, flat
rate tax. T h e top marginal rate was reduced from 57.5% to
331/3%. I n 1987, the company income tax was also simplified
and its rate reduced from 4 5 % to match the new individual
income tax rate. A new property tax roll was introduced in
1986 and the tax rates were rolled back to cushion the shock.
T o keep step with the structural reform, the organization of
the Revenue Services was revamped, a comprehensive programme o f revenue agent training was established, and.a
full computerization of the tax administration is well underway.' .,
, ,.
,

T h e bauxite industry collapsed, depriving the Government of a major foreign exchange earner. T h e performance of tourism, the other major foreign exchange
earning sector, was spotty.
,
;
There was a substantial Government deficit (around
8% of G D P in 1985). This is an especially important
policy; issue because the Government is a major
employer of unskilled workers, hence expenditure retrenchriient (vs;.revenue, increases) would be a very
difficult path.
:
I ' - r . ' y y i '
There was a heavy debt service burden, averaging over
45% of export earnings in the mid-1980s; ^
Both the inflation rate and the unemployment rate remained high during most of this period.
T h e International Monetary Fund ( I M F ) and the World
The programme appears to have been a success. T h e struct
' Bank brought pressure on the Government to take drastural reform gained general acceptance from the public.
tic measures to control the size of the fiscal deficit and
Government revenues increased (in spite of the nominal tax
to reform its tariff structure.
' ;
rate reductions), - the performance of the business sector
It was reasonable during this period to suppose that a
of the economy iinproved, and there was a noticeable imJ
U . S . tax reform was in the offing, and that a lowered
provement in tax administration. Jamaica's comprehensive
U . S . corporate tax rate would force a reduction in the
reform programme is not yet complete. A general consumpJamaican corporate tax rate.
tion tax of the value added type has been designed to replace
much of the present, complicated system of 5 separate indiI n short, there was a great deal of pressure to find ways of
rect taxes, and a total overhaul of the payroll system tax has
raising more revenue to solve.some of the Government's
been proposed. I n both cases the emphasis is on simphficaiinmediate probleiris and this seemed incompatible with the
tion, removing the tax influence of economic decisions,
goal of developing a structural reform that would gain broad
fairness arid revenue neutrality.^
,
public support and stimulate new private investment.
The purpose of this article is to describe the tax reform
programme, provide a first, ex post evaluation of its success,
and to suggest the lessons from the experience that could be
useful to fiscal planners in other developing countries.
'
T H E ECONOMIC AND POLICY. SETTING .

The Jamaica case may dispel a longstanding myth about
comprehensive tax reform: the proposition that it cannot
take place in a weak economic setting. Severe economic
problems had to be confronted duripg the period of the
Jamaican tax reform, and the Government could not keep
its attention focused solely on restructuring its tax system
and improving its.administrative set-up. T h e following will
give some idea of the calls on economic poHcy during this
p
e
r
i
o
d
:
'
.
J
,
There was a serious exchange rate disequilibrium which
eventually led to a major devaluation of the Jamaican
dollar in November 1983. ;
c
;i : .
.r

-

But not all was negative. Prime Minister Seaga was elected
in 1980 with a mandate to "free-up the economy", and there
, was much to free up. T h e foreign trade sector was charac-

1. The tax reform project was carried out jointly by the Revenue Board
of the Government of Jamaica and the Metropolitan Studies Program of
the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. The co-directors of the Project
were Canute Miller, Chairman of the Revenue Board, and Roy Bahl;
Maxwell Professor of Political Economy at Syracuse University. The research staff included Jamaica's top tax analysts and several of the most
experienced public finance scholars and practitioners in the worid. A set
of the 37 staff papers from the project is available from the Metropolitan
Studies Program, Maxwell School, Syracuse University,.Syracuse, New
York 13244-1090-, and The Jamaican Tax Reform is forthcoming from
Oegleschlager, Gunn and Hain of Boston.
?. :V
'
2.
Michael Manley became Prime Minister in early 1989 and one of the
first steps of his administration was to label a Ministry Paper proposing
adoption of a general consumption tax. Details of the proposal have not
yetbeenworkedout.:
• ' . . • . i - ^ ' ? ; - . ^y''
V ''^^
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terized by quotas and licensing to restrict imports and to
compensate for an overvalued Jamaican dollar. A n inherited import substitution growth strategy and a very compUcated tariff structure were in place, and there were substantial price controls, Government ownership of some traditionally private sector activities, and very high marginal
income tax rates. T h e Prime Minister's economic strategy
of replacing Government controls with market forces fit
very well with a structural tax reform programme designed
to "get the prices right". Moreover, the Seaga administration won an overwhelming majority in Parliament in a 1984
election. This enhanced the possibilities of eventually passing a tax reform bill. Another stimulus to action came from
the external donors - the' U . S . Government, the World
B a n k and the I M F - all of whom were enthusiastic about
Jamaica's plans for tax reform. Finally, the Jamaican tax
system had become so onerous, so obviously unfair and so
out of control that there was substantial public sentiment
for a major overhaul. I n many ways, then, the time was right
for tax reform.
.
^
^
T a x policy strategy .
A t the outset of the Project, assessment of Jamaica's tax
problems pointed to 3 issues. :First, taxes were too high.
Taxes were too high by comparison with other countries at
similar.levels of income and foreigii trade. More important,
however, is that the Jamaican system taxed such a narrow
base that the nominal average and marginal rates had to be
very high to generate an adequate revenue yield; F o r example, a value added tax, equal in yield to the present indirect
tax system and using the same exemptions as existed in
1983, would have required a irate! of about 20%; the top
marginal personal income tax rate was 57.5% (not including
payroll taxes) and was reached at the relatively low income
I e v e l o f J $ 14,000.3
The second basic problem was the tax.structure. It was
complicated and therefore difficult and costly, to administer
and there were important disincentives inherent in the rate
and base structures. Interest was tax-free^ but dividends
were taxed twice, there was a high income tax rate on formal
sector ( P A Y E ) labour income but the self-employed went
virtually untaxed, the high marginal tax rates produced a
substantial incentive for evasion and avoidance, many types
of imports were exempt from the indirect tax system, and
so on. The system was also chariacterized by a poor enforcement which compounded the inequities'. T h e problem was
simply that the Jamaican tax structure had evolved over a
period of time - as much because of year-to-year, pressures
to solve budget deficits as for any other reason. B y 1983 the
issue was clear: the Government had gone as far as it could
with piecemeal tax reform and the time was right for a
comprehensive overhaul of the tax structure!
T h i r d , the administration of the tax system was weak. There
were too few trained tax administrators, salaries were not
competitive with the private sector and there was limited
opportunity for advancement. These administrative problems were heightened by the comphcated system which was
difficult to administer in any case, and by outmoded procedures. F o r example, there was no manual for income tax
administration, nor were there procedures in place to assess
the self-employed or to use third party information to detect
non-reporting or under-reporting. Audit activities were Umited and not productive, and the administration of the
income and payroll taxes was not integrated. Finally, the
administrative system was not fully computerized and there
was general disarray in the record-keeping.
© 1990 International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
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I n the face of this assessment of problems, the Project took
the view that the highest priorities were (a) simplification of
the system, and (b) making the tax structure more neutral
with respect to consumer and investor choices. T h e policy
direction of these objectives is clear: establish broader
based, flatter rate taxes that are more easily administered.
The basic hypothesis is that the price effects introduced by
non-neutralities in the Jamaican tax system do matter, i.e.
the tax system has contributed to a reduced work effort,
increased capital and labour mobiUty from the formal to the
self-employed sector, thin capitalization of companies, capital flight, low investment relative to consumption, high
retained earnings relative to,distributions and a larger underground economy.
The Project did not take the view that the correct tax reform
strategy was to develop a system that would lead and "fine
tune" economic policy. T h e general position taken was that
the market and not tax treatment should dictate business
and individual economic decisions, and that, in any case,
the present administrative system could not carry the implementation of such a programme. Experience with the
existing system; which is in more of an interventionist tradition, was that the goals of the present,'complicated structure were not being achieved anyway: progressive fate structures were not generating a progressive distribution of tax
burdens," complicated provisions for payroll taxes of the
self-employed could not, induce them to make .payments;
tax incentives for overtime were being abused and not leading to; increased overtime work, a system of non-taxable
perquisites had become a major loophole rather than a tax
relief and was beyond the control of the income tax administration,'etc.

';!,•:.•,.i;:.rrIA.^^'S

-rM

This assessment of problems and definition of objectives of
the Project led to a 3-part programme for the tax reform:
policy analysis to restructure the system, improved administrative procedures and the establishment of a training p r o gramme. T h e basic tenet of the Project was that the reform
should be comprehensive and that the administrative improvements should be designed to be compatible with the
policy changes. T o try to improve the administration of a
system so deficient as that in Jamaica clearly would have
been counterproductive.
Individual income t a x
The individual income tax base, in theory, included all
sources of income except bank deposit interest. I n practice,
there was no tax on capital gains and most self-employed
income was outside the tax net. There were 2 rate structures
- d e p e n d i n g on whether income was above or below
J$ 7,000.;The top marginal rate was 57.5%: When payroll
taxes are taken into account, the marginal tax rate on a
Jamaican income (J$ 14,000) was well in excess of 60%.
There was no standard deduction but taxpayers could qualify for 16 separate tax credits; These credits had been added
to the tax system over a period of years for purposes that
ranged from personal allowances to stimulation of savings
and home ownership, and even employment of helpers in
the home. Because the credits were not indexed to inflation,
their value had substantially eroded during the early 1980s.
The income tax administration did relatively little monitoring of the credit system,
;
'
/' :
; j'
The base of the tax was further eroded by the practice of
permitting'employers to grant non-taxable perquisites ( " a l 3. -The average exchange'rate when the income tax reform was constructed in final form in 1985 was US$1 = J$ 5.56.:
• '
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lowances") to employees. These perquisites were a iriatter
of negotiation between employer and employee (including
Government ministries) a u d i t was not required that they
be reported to the Income T a x Commissioner. There was a
great deal of speculation about the magnitude of allowances
- some, promment Jamaican analysts speculated that the
allowance-taxable wage ratio averaged as much as 4 0 % .
The analysis of reform options required first estimating the
number of taxpayers, taxable incomes, non-taxable perquisites and tax credits - all by income class. This was done by
drawing a large random sampleof Jamaican taxpayers and
manually recording data on taxable income, tax credits, tax
liability, etc. from the files on each employer arid each
individual. T h e Prime Minister organized a special survey
of employers to estimate the value of non-taxable allowances by income bracket. This was.supplemented,with a
sample survey of a large number of self-employed iridividuals to determme the exterit of evasion by non-reporting. T h e
results of this analysis indicated that about half of pbteritial
individual income tax liability was not covered in the tax
net. Moreover,' higher income Jamaicans '-7 riiariy outside
the P A Y E system - tended to avoid or evade a substantially
higher percentage of their tax liability than did lower income
families'. T h e progressivity of the statutory rate structure
was all but negated by evasion and avoidance.
Simulation of alternative rate and base structures, with a
revenue neutral target in mind and with simplification and
neutrality as primary objectives, led to the following reform
programme: • ••.s.;,-- o'
iy:'^:'^.
T, Replace the present graduated rate structure with a flat
; , ; r a t e o f 3 3 % % . v 'y.r-,-:..,,
',T,y[,'..,,
, ,/ .
Replace the 16 tax credits with a standard deduction oif
8,580 per year.
r • •-...y •:
-,, .\yith a fevv exceptions, bring all non-taxable allowances
r//into'the.base.,,
, ":^,::;;:J^; v,^
Include bank deposit interest (above a low ceiling) in
'
the inconie tax base. _ .
;ri ;
;;v ;
The Government enacted this programme after a T a x R e form Committee of private sector citizens: spent several
months scrutinizing and amending the proposals; T h e Committee, comprised of union, business and pubhc interest
group representatives, reached consensus that the flat tax
seemed-more fair than-the present'system'and recommended its adoption to the Prime Minister. T h e income tax
reform became effective at the beginnirig o f 1986 and was
almost totally operative by the end of the first quarter.
C o m p a n y income t a x
Prior to the reform, companies paid a basic rate of 35% plus
ari "additional tax" of 10%, but the additional rate could be
offset agairist withholding tax 'on dividends. T o complicate
matters further, there was separaite treatment for agricultural compariies, incentive firms arid financial institutions.';
This system led to 3 basic problems. First, the tax was
comphcated, not easily administered, and unfair to certain
types of firms. Second, it discriminated in favour of.debt
and against equity finance, in favour of retaining rather than
distributing earnings, and against risk taking; T h e "optimal"
dividend J distribution irate for a firm: was about 27%. of
profits - above this amount "additionar' profit tax liability
would be due; Moreover; in the eyes of investors, dividends
were taxed twice whereas interest received from ^savings
accounts was not taxed at all. T h i r d , the reductiori in the top
individual income tax rate to 33V3% and the reduction in the
U ; S. corporate rate brought new pressures to lower the
company tax rate.
^^:^^ . , u
>

The Government enacted a comprehensive reforin of the
company tax in 1987. T h e tax rate was reduced to 33V3%
and the "additional tax" was eHminated. This removed the
disincentive to larger dividend distributioris; and though the
Government did not eliminate the preferential treatment of
retained earnings, it did bring interest income into the tax
base thereby removing another disincentive to equity f i nance.' F u l l loss •carry-fpiTvard was iritroduced, removing
some of the bias against risk-taking, and branch and subsidiary companies were given an equal tax treatment.
The Project's proposal to exempt dividerids from personal
tax liability was rejected. The Government instead decided
on a separate eritity approach whereby company profits and
dividends each would be taxed.at 33V3%, thus passing on
the opportunity to fully (and simply') integrate the income
tax. Why would such an opportunity pe passed? One reason
given was that the Government was in a crucial stage of its
negotiations with the I M F and under pressure to minimize
the revenue cost of the reform package. Another explanation is political, i.e. the Government's sensitivity to the
growing public perception that it had become the party of
the "big man".' The;Government was still feeling the criticism over the taxation of interest income that had been
iritroduced, along with steep cuts in the marginal personal
income tax fateslheyear before. There also was the problem of explaining to the public the difficult concept of integration.: ,
„, ,
Property t a x

"

. •

Relative to the amount of revenue it raises, the property tax
is the most politically sensitive tax in the Jamaican system;
I n fact, the problems with the property tax in Jamaica are
not primarily structural. T h e structure of the tax itself is one
that, properly implemented, could serve as a model for
other countries. F o r a nuiriber of years, however, the Government was unwilling to operate the tax according to the
law with the result that it became negligible in revenue yield
and unfair in the distributiori of burden it imposed.
'
The base of the property tax is the unimproved market
value of land, i.e.' the value of faiw land, or the value of a
parcel of developed (iriiproved) land as it would be if there
were no structures on the site. T h e valuation roll is to be
updated every 3 to 5 years, though in practice it is much less
frequent. There are 3 important classes of preferential rate
treatment or exemption: agricultural properties, hotel properties and low value pi-operties. I n effect,!Jamaica's is a
classified property tax with lower rate schedules applying to
agricultural and hotel properties, f
; r
t?
'
About 60% of Jamaica's 550,000 parcels have land values
less than J$ 2,000 (about U.S.$ 500in 1984), and are subject
to a nominal property tax charge of J$ 5 per year. T h e
remaining properties are taxed according to a rate structure
that is progressive in tefiris of land value,''risirig to 4;5% on
a site value of J$ 50;000.:';
: • :^; - v ; ^ , ; u (,;. ; :;
The revenue yield from the tax has fallen; over the past
decade frorn a little over 5% of total revenues to about 2 % .
This decline occurred principally because the schedule of
assessed values was not changed between 1974 and 1986.
The property tax is a central goyernment levy in Jamaica,
arid local governments do not share explicitly in the revenue
yield.-;
;
;
.
v
There are 2 problems with the property tax as it has been
practiced in Jamaica. T h e first grows out of the failure of
the Government to bring in a newvaluation roll for 12
years, and the second has to do with inadequacies iri'the
© 1990 International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
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day-to-day administration of the tax. More debatable as
"problems" are whether the progressive rate structure discourages compliance, and whether the improved value, of
property would be a more appropriate base.
;
:/
Before the 1986 reform, the taxed base was the 1974 value
of sites; Because this base was fixed for over a decade, the
yield from the property tax fell to its neghgible present
position in the revenue structure. This lack of buoyancy
created a number of problems:
:
•, '
T h e low revenue yield puts that much more pressure oh
,
the individual income tax and indirect taxes to carry the
revenue l o a d ; "
''''.'S','
.-r'.'.
Landowners are undertaxed relative to labour and owners of capital. This discriminatory practice fits neither
the economic nor the social policy of the Government.,
Landowners were not taxed according to the present
'
values of their properties, biit according to the 1974
values. Because the pattern of land values has changed
dramatically during this period, the resulting distribu. tion of tax burden is unfair.
'
, /
Finally, there are problems with'the administration of the
property tax. Consider the following:'
,
'
The collection rate for the property tax is'only about
T h e collection cost is equivalent to about 12% of reve•••=nue collected/
'
•---i.^^
^ ' ; ^ , < ; There are no reUable records on derated properties, i;e.
no list of the total number that receive preferential
treatment, the nature of the preference, etc. v;i,
About one-third of the sites on the roll do not have any
coding as to use. .
.
Total property tax arrears are equivalent to over 2 years
revenue yield.
:
n
.
,•
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The Government followed the recommendations to bring in
the new land value base and to roll back the tax rates so as
to minimize the amount of tax shock. T h e derating programme for agricultural and hotel properties was continued.
O n the subj ect of the next revaluation, the Government
committed to work on an indexing system, but little progress
has yet been made. T h e reform programme,'enacted in
1986, has been a mixed success.
Revenue growth nearly reached target amounts after 2
years, thanks in part .to significant administrative efforts.
However, the Goyernment responded by freezing the nominal rates at the 1986 level which probably guarantees that
the property tax vviir remain at approximately 2 % o f revenues.
• , ,
, '
A s in all countries, property taxation draws criticism from
the' public that it is far but of proportion to the amount of
tax burden involved. This was also the case in Jamaica. One
possible reason for the opposition is that it is a national tax
and therefore the financing: link to spiecific local services
cannot be easily seen; Another is that the Government was
unsuccessful in convincing voters that one price of the popular income tax rate reductions was an increase in the property tax.
•
•
. r

-

The Project and the T a x Reform Committee considered a
number of options for reforming the property tax, and recommended the following:
:'
. >
.
1.

The land value base should be maintained.;

2.

The revenue from the property tax should be 3 times
the present level. This would restore the property tax
to the revenue level it would.have achieved if its base
had been kept up to date.

3.

The 1984 valuation roll should be adopted, and a flat
rate should be applied to all land with value in excess
V of J $ 6,000.'This would keep ab6uf60% of properties
off the roll. T o avoid tax shock, it is advisable to phase
this new system in gradually, by even increments over
a 3-year period.

4. Agricultural and hotel derating should be eUminated or
•jH'substantially cut back. ,., .
5.._ T h e administrative,systeni should be completely overhauled, with particular emphasison (a) improving col;
lection procedures and record^keeping, (b) developing
a sales data bank that would permit assessment-sales
ratio studies, (c) indexing land values to update the
valuation roll between general revaluations, and (d)
monitoring relief and derating in a more systematic way.
The T a x Reform Committee generally accepted these recommendations in proposing a tripling of the revenues to
be accompanied by an equal amount reduction in the income tax, the bringingin of the'1984 roll, the retention of
the land value basis, and a 3-year period to.phase in the
reform. T h e Committee-was silent on the issue of derating
and held to the present progressive rate structure.
, :s {
© 1990 International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation

A successful income t a x reform? •
No effort has yet been mounted to systematically monitor
the impact of the flat, tax reform. T h e major problem, of
course, vvould be to try to separate the effects o f tax changes
from • the - effects of everything else that is 'affecting the
Jamaican economy. Still, from the macro evidence; there is
some indication of success. Perhaps the best indicator is the
lack of any continuing public discontent with the incoiiie tax
reform. T h e press was not critical, the poHtical opposition
did not raise substantial objections - even during the recent
national elections, labour seems to be pleased with the
relatively high standard;deduction; and with the fairness of
a flat rate, and the business community clearly has benefited
from the lower coinpany tax rate. T o be sure, there was
initial resentment to taxing interest income - this led,to
exemption from small deposits - and there was the expected
grousing from special interests about the lossof tax preferences. T h e important point, however, is tliat the public
adjusted to the initial shock of the change and though taxes
are never as low or even as fair as citizens would hke, the
new system would appear to be much more palatable than
the previous one.
vi, : : >
D i d the income tax reforms,stimulate the economy iafter
1986? Something did. Corporate profits rose - through Au-gust 1987, the 16 largest listed companies reported post-tax
profits 84%. higher than the same period in the, previous
year;'The Jamaican stock exchange had record growth duringT986 and 1987. T h e market index went from 941.5 at the
end of 1985 to 1499.8 at the end of 1987and stood at 1757.7
in 1987. O f course, the tax reform is only one of the number
of positive factors that affected the Jamaican economy. T h e
interest rate dropped from 93% at the beginning of 1986 to
16.7% in 1987. T h e real growth in exports was up by 10.3%
in 1986 over the 1980-1985 period average and real G N P
increased by 2 . 1 % in-1986. T h e rate of inflation declined
from;25;7% for all of 1985 to 1 5 . 1 % for 1986, and was
running a t 7 . 1 % for the first 5 months of 1987. O n the basis
of available:evidence,;no one could argue the;extent to
which these changes are due to the tax reform, but many
would be prepared to argue that so favourable a perfor-

manceof the Jamaican economy could not have taken place
under the old regime.''
.\ r-::/.
•
.
The revenue'neutraUty target of the reform'was attained,
perhaps even surpassed. Comparing the same quarter in the
firstyear of the reform (1986) with 1985, P A Y E collections
were uf) 9.7%, and in 1987, the same comparison shows a
17.9% increase over 1986. T o t a l ^coinpany and personal
income taxes in the second quarter of 1987 were about 18%
above second qiiarter 1986 collections - a substantial increase in real terms. Some part of this increase no doubt is
due to administration. T h e simpler income tax system has
made it possible for the income tax department to cohcehtrate more on enforcement of the system and there is evidence of a more effective audit and examination activity.
More vigorous audit activities have led to a triphng of additional taxes and penalties i n 1987, over 1986.
-. . ;
There is also a question of the fairness of the new reform.
The P r o e c t has estimated, that the combination of the
lower, flat rate; the ,J$ 8,580 standard deduction: and
broadened base did not worsen the regressivity of the system
and, indeed, that improved administration holds the promise of making the new system more progressive than the o l d ; ;
The structiiral reform stimulated administrative improve-^
merits. T h e revenue services have been reorganized to bet-'
ter integrate assessmerit and collections; an'extensivetrain-^
ing programme for revenue agents' has commenced';' a'
number of courses for income tax assessments and collections have been successfully completed; and corriputerization of the revenue services is now well underway.
The reform is not without problems - no reform ever is;
Perhaps the major problem is that the door was left ojpen',
for abuse of certain perquisites to avoid income tax payment/
- the housing allowance, the travel allowance and uniform
allowances. There already appear to be some misuses of
these provisions for non-taxable income and if they continue
to grow they could compromise'the fairness of the new;
structure and bring pressure for a rate increase. Another'
important problem was that provision was riot made in the
original reform package to index the standard deductiori.
The result was "bracket creep"^ in the 'sense that real
economic growth on the island pushed many taxpayers from the zero to the 33V3% bracket. However, just prior to the
1989 elections, the non-taxable ' threshold was:increased'
from J$ 8,580 to J$ 10,400. This approximately "indexed"
the individual income tax for the 1986-1988 period,and
dropped 32,000 potential 1989 taxpayers froni the roll, at a';
revenue cost of J$ 106 million or about 20% of projected;
revenues.
'" ;
'
Tlie Jamaican tax reform is in itsearly^stages and is fragile..
Indicatiorislare,' however, that its' early peffonriarice has.
niore than lived up to expectations. T h e objectives of creat-;
ing a simpler system that is more easily administered and,
has fewer price distortions appears to have been achieved.
This has been done without compromising revenue yield,
and, using the Project's estimates, without having unfavourable effects on the distribution of tax burdens.,
,,
T H E UNFINISHED A G E N D A
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A sweeping reform of the present system of indirect taxation ,
has been designed but not yet implemented. Presently,
there are 5 separate indirect taxes: (a) consumption duty,
the-most important revenue component o f the system, i s ;
levied on the value of imported and domestically produced •
goods and is collected at the import and the manufacturing •
stage; (b) retail sales tax and excise duties which are insig-

nificant in terms of revenues raised; (c) customs duty which
is a relatively small revenue source,by international standards; and (d) stamp duty on inward customs warrants which
has becoriie a major fiscal instrument. This system is overly;
complex, distorts economic choices', is income inelaistic arid
baidly admiriistered.','-":';: ,/7',;',',.',,''-;J';>.",
. Y^.^'y^] ''•nY-t
The Project proposed that a general consuinptiori tax replace the present system. T h e base of the tax will include
importers, manufacturers;and large distributors, with the
value added feature of allowing a credit for taxes paid ori'
inputs: Exporters would be zero-rated (no tax would be due
on value added and air taxes paid on inputs would be refunded) and the major consumption items for low income
famiUes would be.excluded from tax, but otherwise therev
will be few exemptions. This should lower the costs of administration and compliance, riiake the system less horizontally inequitable, and eliminate some unintended effects on
methods,of doing business. F o r reasons of administration,,
much of the service sector vyill be outside the base, as will
small j - handicraft-type manufacturers,' smaller distributors
and all but the largest retailers, J It is proposed that the'
present system of taxing cigarettes, petroleum products and
spirits remainunchanged fori the time being in order to
protect revenue and minimize the amount of disruptiori
associated with the reform.' : i - :
:
v .
The other unfinished part of the reform is the payroll taxes..
There are 2 major piroblems that the Government needs to
address with structural reforrii. T h e first is the narrow base
ori which the payroll taxes are levied and consequently the
high nominal rates of tax. T h e second problem is tnat adriiinistration of the 5 different payroll taxes is fragmented and
there is little coordination among the programmes. T h e
Project reconimended that payroll tax reform should concentrate on simplification of the system, a broadening of the
tax base and a lowering of rates, and a general overhaul of
the administration of these,5 taxes.
;
: ^
A t trie timCjOf the jiricoriie,tax reform
of
payroll tax cqntfibution was'frozen',!arid at the tiriie of this
writing, no pefrnarierit improvements have been made. ,
LESSONS FOR T A X R E F O R M
The Jamaican tax Project was a rare opportunity for comprehensive tax reform in a developing country. The mandate at the outset called for a restructuring of the tax system
to fit a new economic programme of a newly-elected administration, and the Project was given substantial latitude in"
defining the coverage' o f the; work. T h e experience in
Jamaica provides a real-world setting in which to rethink
some of the principles of tax reform and tax poUcy analysis
in developing countries.' I n some cases, old lessons were
relearned. B u t the Jamaica experience also suggested some
areas where the conventional wisdom ought to be challenged.
• •
"
1. A comprehensive reform of the tax structure can be carried
out when the economy is performing poorly

There is a sense that something must be done and tax policy
is one area where the Government can take aggressive ac-.
tion. I n such times, it is "easier to focus the attention of
poHcymakers on the structural problems within the.entire
4.' PrimeMinisteV Edward, Seaga, relating the tax project to the im-'
proved performance of the economy, said: "This year we are experiencing •
the highest levels of growth that the country has enjoyed since the early»'
1970s':, Daily Gleaner, 10October 1987;
nr; i i n u ; :
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tax system and to think through the ways in which the tax
system may be retarding economic growth. , : L '
Jamaica's tax reforrii project began when the economy was
in dire straits: real G N P was declining," a deyaluation was
quite clearly in the imniediateoffirig, the external debt!
burden was heavy and the country was under pressure from
the I M F and World B a n k to reduce its budget deficit and
limit domestic borrowing, and the unemployment and inflation rates were at high levels. Things were bad enough that
the Administration and the general pubhc were in agreement that nothing shortof a complete overhaul of the tax
system would do.
2. Comprehensive reform can take place, only if tfie system Is
shocked
'
•
.'.
The conventional theory suggests an incremental approach
to tax reform, i.e. it argues that i f the existing system is,
shocked too much, it will compromise the.success of the
proposed reform; While there is,wisdom in this argument,
the Jamaica experience suggests not only,that the tax system:
can be shocked under the right circumstances, but that;
comprehensive; reform can only take place if ;the system is
shocked. There are 2 principal supporting arguments. T h e
first is that the reform must bring enough of a change for
the taxpayer to see a package of gains and losses. The
second'is that the'response of'savings, investment, work
effort and compliance to a tax rate change may be quite
small, and therefore it will take big structural changes to
have any significant impact.
;,. :.
: ".
Every tax reform cannot be comprehensive, and all students
of public finance in developing'countries know that tax
shock can be a disaster. T h e Jamaica case, however,:can
highhght the conditions under which big changes can work.
First, the Government and the pubUc must have lost confi-j
dence in the present system. Certainly Jamaica had reached;
the point where patchwork reform was no longer good
enough. Second, the Goverriment and the public need time
to absorb the shock .'There was a full 6-month debate of the'
proposals in the Jamaican press and by the time of enactment, the shock effect had pretty much dissipated. T h i r d ,
the possibility of revenue shock - large first year losses that,
might result from transition problems or from the appear-'
ance of unexpected loopholes - were guarded against in the
Jamaica reform. Finally, the administrative systerii must be
able to absorb the change.
3. .Vertical equity cannot be the driving force behind a. i :
comprehensive tax reform programme In a developing iu
country
In part, this is because developing countries cannot successful y implement "progressive'' features of tax systems and,
in part, it is because the costs of vertical equity are very
high. TTie creation of a progressive distribution of tax burdens may not everi be a primary consideration in formulating a tax structure revision because of the inherent tradeoff,
between vertical equity on the one hand and the goals of
efficiency and simplification on the other.
What is the place of equity in comprehensive tax reform?
The first goal ought to be to protect the'lowest income
families in the society. T h e Jamaican Project carried out a
family budget survey to identify the market basket of low
income families and used these results in the recommendations for indirect tax reform, to work toward a system that,,
was roughly proportional' iri its distribution of effective •
rates. Fine tuning the distribution of tax burdens to achieve •
some particular pattern of progression was not considered. '
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More important is the issue of horizontal e q u i t y - what the
Jamaicans seem to have equated with fairness in taxation.
The system was riddled with inequities: private sector workr
ers received more income in non-taxable perquisites thari
pubhc sector workers, self-eiriployed workers paid lower
taxes than those in the P A Y E sector, those in certain iridustries had access to the prefereritial "overtime" tax rate while
others did riot, only sorne types of businesses could erigage
in arbitrage to avoid income taxes, etc. Such unequal treatment had uridermined.confidence in the tax system. T h e
pririiary goal of the Jamaican study was to find a way to
eliminate these horizontal iriequities and the distortions iri
economic choices which they promoted.
4. : Empirical estimates of the impact of proposed tax reforms lift the debate to a much higher level than otherwise would
be the case .,
The quality of the underlying data may not be without
problems, but they give a basis for removing some of the
guesswork in evaluating the options. A major problem in
defeating special interest group opposition to reform in
almost every country is the mythology surrounding the implications of changing each element of the system.
I n Jamaica, the individual income tax reform was particularly influenced by the data analysis. I n fact, it is very doubt-,
ful that so sweeping a reform as this could have occurred in
the absence of a rigorous statistical study. About 200 coriibinations of rate and;base were eventually run through the
simulation model before a finalstructure was chosen. ; , / i
The empirical work was useful in demonstrating features of
the tax system that "were either not known or not obvious:
The following are good examples: ( a ) several of the 16
income tax credits were not being used extensively; hencetheir abohtion would not, imply the revenue loss or the
sensitive political issue that was T e a r e d ; ( b ) the present
graduated rate structure was not progressive in its distribu-.'
tion of effective tax burdens, and (c) the income tax regime;
which taxes dividend income at both the company and per-;
sonal levels probably has less effect on dividend payout,
rates than does the preferential treatment of retained earnings.;
.
.
.
5. Get the policy right and, then deal with the administrative
problems

.

The consumers and sponsors of a reform often cannot" see
beneath a plethora or administrative problems to the real
issue, which may well be a badly structured tax.
There are 3 good reasons for giving policy reform priority
over administrative reform. First, administrative improve-,
ments can often generate a quick revenue impact. Because;
this may satisfy some of the urgency about "reforming" the:
tax system, the Government may lose its enthusiasm about;
rethinking its tax policy. Second, the true underlying prob-.
lem iriay be with the tax structure. It may be so comphcated
as to be beyond the capacity of the Government to properly •
administer, or it may be so urifair that payment of taxes w i l l '
be resisted no matter how much the administration improves. T h i r d , if the reform goes no further than administration, the Government will not go through the exercise of
questioning whether the tax system is affecting the economy
in ways that reinforce,Govemment policy objectives.
;
The Jamaica case offers some good illustrations of why. tax;
poUcy considerations should lead such work. T h e individual;
income taxi; was ^hopelessly complicated, with 3 ; rate;
schedules,' 16 tax credits, and a system under which;
employers could choose to grant non-taxable perquisites to"
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their employees. I t would have been virtually impossible to
improve the administration of p c h a tax and resources
spent in that direction would likely have been wasted. ,
None of this is to saythat poor tax administration is not at
the heart of the fiscal-problems of most developing countries. Indeed; policy reform without administrative reform
can bring little gain. T h e Jamaica Project included a substantial effort in the direction of establishing a training
centre, improving assessment procedures and computerizing the record-keeping function.. :;.
>'} I
> I
6. The results of a tax reform should be carefully monitored
in the first years after implementation
While it is essential that the reform study generate,the best
possible forecast of revenue yield, tax burden impacts and
economic effects, it is. also essential that the tax planner
know the actual outcome and be ready to adjust the new
system as necessary. I t is especially important that the
monitoring begin immediately after the reform is implemented and before new avenues of avoidance become
entrenched. T h e more dramatic the structural reform and
administrative "shock," the more likely are such loopholes
to appear and the harder they are to detect.
This is an important problem with the Jamaica reform. T h e
income tax reform was meant to result in a significant adjustment in the compensation package for P A Y E employees away from allowances and toward wages and salaries. H o w :
ever, some loopholes were left open and these would dampen the propensity to convert allowances to wages. It i s ;
clear that there have been some abuses, but in the absence
of monitoring it is not clear how much. Consequently, the
guidelines for further tightening'legislation or providing
tougher ehforcemerit regulations are not clear.
Another reason for monitoring is to determine whether the
reforms' have rriet revenue'targets and consequently whether
some base or rate structure revision is necessary. It is not
enough to simply,rely on the ex ante projections of the
revenue impact of the reform. After .the Jamaica reform,
the revenue yield turned out to be much greater than had
been expected because the economy grew much faster than
had been assumed in the forecast. This resulted in revenues
well above the first year targets, and an increase in the
average income tax burden. A r m e d with accurate revenue
projections, the Government would have been in a position
to at least discuss a second round of rate reductions.
7. It Is better to do a comprehensive fiscal reform - which
also Includes consideration of the expenditure side of the
budget - than a comprehensive tax' reform
T o be sure, this is a more difficult job, requires more resources and time; and probably raises many more controversial issues, but it allows the Government to get a better
picture of the overall implications of the tax reform under
consideratioii/'',::'
Fiscal reform is also more desirable because it allows a more
comprehensive study of the options for getting the prices
"right", balancing the budget, affecting the distribution of
income through the budget process, evaluating least cost
methods of achieving certain objectives, etc. T h e Jamaica
reform was more far-reaching than most tax studies in that
it considered the financing of public 'enterprises, the benefits
of tax incentive legislation and the effectiveness of the Government's food stamp prograinme. Still, the work came up
far short bf.xohsidering even some of the most relevant
expenditure side issues;!forexample,,the actuarial position
of the,payroll tax contribution programmes, and the pos-

sibilities for user charge financing; T h e Project did a reasonable job of estimating who pays for the Jamaican public
sector but it did not go very far in considering who benefits.
8. T a x policies should be designed to mesh with the
economic policies already in place

.

"

Perhaps the most difficult part of designing a comprehensive
tax reform is to match the tax policy design with the set of
economic policies that is already in place.lt is easy to recite
the maxims of a "good tax", arid to come to the proper
conclusion that it should be neutral in its effects on economic
choices. I n the case of Jamaica, this matched the stated goal
of the Government to rely more heavily on market forces
to guide economic growth. However, there is almost always
another set of policies in place that raise questions about
whether neutrality is an appropriate objective of the tax
reform.
Jamaica's trade and industrial policies are highly targeted
on specific industries, export promotion and the conservation of scarce foreign exchange. Moreover, the Government's poUcy was pointed to holding a fixed exchange rate
in terms of the U . S . dollar. I f the tax reform moved in the
direction of removing some of the existing distortions in the
system, would the Government respond by strengthening
its targeted programmes to restore the special treatments
that the tax system had taken away?
9. Successful comprehensive reform requires that special
.•attention be paid to implementation of the reform measures
The Jairiaica reforin suggests 5 rules about how to get to
successful implementation of a tax reform. First, the Gov-ernment must see the project as primarily its own,and not
that of a dorior or even that of a technical assistance research
team. T h e personal and close' irivolvement of the Prime
Minister set the tone for the Jamaica work, and the Chair-|
man of the Revenue Board was an active participant in the
research and a leading contributor to the thinking. A very
important, and beneficial development in the Jamaica work,
was the Prime Minister's appointment of an independent
T a x Reform Committee. T h e Committee was comprised of
'12 leading citizeris and included representatives of most of
the major public interest groups. The Project worked directly as staff to| the Committee in their review of the tax
reform proposals and in the formulation of the alternatives
which they put forth to the Government.
Second, the technical assistance team should have the right
mix of skills and experience, and above all, should have
expert credentials. Nothing short of well-known tax policy
experts with extensive policy experience would have satisfied the Jamaicans. The Government was understandably
uneasy about the risks and uncertainties associated with the
reform and, moreover, some aspects of the reform were
very complicated and others raised important issues of administration that appeared to be stumbling blocks. I t was
essential to have senior staff who could draw easily and
confidently on knowledge of tax systeriis and of successes
• and f a i l u f e s ' e l s e w h e r e . ; ; r ^ V . . ^ • ^ ^ r i " • • ' A . - r ^ • ' ;-

T h i r d , tax reform should not be hurried. It takes time to get
the technicarproposals properly in place; and the public
debate needs time. T h e design work on the income tax took
more than one year, and on the C G T , took longer. The
Jamaicari press and pubhc interest groups were all involved
in the debate, at a surprisingly technical level, for a fuir6
months before the income tax reform was implemented. B y
the time the law was enacted, a very major change in the
system was not seen by the public as a tax "shock".
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Fourth, there is an important issue of timing. T h e income
tax reform has been enacted but the Government has hot
yet moved to introduce the G C T or restructure the payroll
taxes. The lesson here is that a Government is not willing
to be identified indefinitely with tax reform, even good tax
reform. •
';
'
'.y:
, ,
, .
Comprehensive reform tends to be associated with a particular administration and there'is heed to get on with it
while the power is in place and while there is still enthusiasm
for the reform programme. E v e n the best of tax programmes carries unfavourable connotations for most citizens and politicians, and the zeal for e v e n s o n o b l e a goal
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as "getting the prices right", wanes as time goes by
election years draw near.
" '
• •

and

Fifth, implementation requires a great deal of in-country
attention. T h e Project had 2 income tax administration experts and a customs expert resident in country to work out
administrative procedures and. to assist in training, and a
sales tax administration expert to do the same for the G C T .
There were also a general economic advisor for one year,
junior American and Jamaican staff, and a functioning project office in the Revenue Board in Kingston. This made the
Project less remote to the Jamaicans and enabled daily
liaison.
••••
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